eCommons@AKU
Section of General Surgery

Department of Surgery

6-2011

Terrorist bombings: Medical response in a developing country
Hasnain Zafar
Aga Khan University, hasnain.zafar@aku.edu

Ahmed Jawad
Aga Khan University

Muhammad Shahzad Shamim
Aga Khan University, shahzad.shamim@aku.edu

Ayaz Ahmed Memon
Aga Khan University

Aamir Hameed Khan
Aga Khan University, aamir.hameed@aku.edu

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.aku.edu/pakistan_fhs_mc_surg_gen
Part of the Neurosurgery Commons, and the Surgery Commons

Recommended Citation
Zafar, H., Jawad, A., Shamim, M. S., Memon, A. A., Khan, A. H., Effendi, M. S., Qureshi, S. (2011). Terrorist
bombings: Medical response in a developing country. Journal of the Pakistan Medical Association, 61(6),
561-566.
Available at: https://ecommons.aku.edu/pakistan_fhs_mc_surg_gen/16

Authors
Hasnain Zafar, Ahmed Jawad, Muhammad Shahzad Shamim, Ayaz Ahmed Memon, Aamir Hameed Khan,
Muhammad Shahrukh Effendi, and Saeed Qureshi

This article is available at eCommons@AKU: https://ecommons.aku.edu/pakistan_fhs_mc_surg_gen/16

Original Article
Terrorist bombings: Medical response in a developing country
Hasnain Zafar,1 Ahmed Jawad,2 M. Shahzad Shamim,3 Ayaz Ahmed Memon,4
Aamir Hameed,5 M. Shahrukh Effendi,6 Saeed Qureshi7
Department of Surgery,1,2,4-6 Department of Neuro-Surgery,3 Aga Khan University Hospital, Department of Surgery,
Dow University of Health Sciences,7 Karachi, Pakistan.

Abstract
Objective: To evaluate the process of transport and immediate Emergency Department (ER) management of
mass casualties following the recent bomb blasts in Karachi and review in detail the medical response and
management of victims undertaken in these two incidents.
Methods: Eyewitness accounts of the victims, medical personnel and newspaper clippings were used to
understand and identify difficulties faced during the rescue process. Data regarding presenting injuries and
their outcomes was also collected from all victims presenting to the emergency department at Aga Khan
University Hospital.
Results: Seventy nine individuals died and over 250 victims were injured in the two incidents. All victims and
dead bodies were shifted to the nearest public sector hospital overwhelming the health care facility.
Subsequently all victims were evacuated to private sector hospitals creating similar difficulties. Over half of the
victims presenting at the emergency department had minor injuries and did not require admission. Most patients
requiring admission needed orthopaedic intervention.
Conclusion: A comprehensive disaster plan with a centralized command and control system is required for the
city of Karachi, involving all stake holders including charity ambulance services, security agencies, and trauma
management facilities. Training courses and exercises for health care personnel should also be made mandatory
to achieve professional excellence.
Keywords: Terrorist Bombing, Mass Casualties, Disaster management (JPMA 61:561; 2011).

Introduction
Globally, terrorism has reached new heights. Pakistan
in particular, has suffered tremendously as a front line state in
the "war on terror". In the year 2009 alone there were 500
terrorist bombings, 2586 terror related incidents with 3021
deaths and 7334 casualties.1 Despite all out efforts to curb this
situation, the number of bomb blasts and resulting fatalities
continue to rise exponentially, year after year. The terrorists
have been constantly evolving in their techniques and targets,
thus causing deadlier results. Consequently, with the given
lack of organizational framework to deal with disasters of this
frequency and magnitude, problems arising as a result of each
one of these events have been unique for the health care and
emergency response system of the country.
Karachi, the largest city of Pakistan is also one of the
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biggest and most densely populated cities of the world. The
city is spread over 3,530 square kilometers (1,360 square
miles) in area, housing an estimated population exceeding
17.5 million. It is the financial, industrial and trade capital of
Pakistan. These facts make the city a lucrative target for
terrorist elements.2 This paper describes two incidents with
three terror related bombings. The first bombing incident
occurred on December 28th 2009, at around 1613 hours when
a religious procession was hit by a planted bomb. The tragic
incident claimed 45 deaths and over 120 individuals were left
injured.3,4 The second incidence on February 5th 2010 had
two separate bombs, both planted on motorbikes. The first
blast at around 1500 hours targeted a bus carrying civilians to
a religious procession. Most of the victims were shifted to a
major public sector hospital, which itself became a target of
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the second bomb blast outside its Emergency Room (ER) at
1645 hours.4 Overall 34 individuals died and 133 were
injured in the two incidents.5,6
The purpose of our study was to review the process of
transport and immediate ED management of victims,
undertaken in these two incidents in relation to the inherent
problems of a developing country. Karachi lacks a central
command and control center. Pre-hospital care and on the
scene triage is non-existent. The city is unique as it does not
have a government run ambulance service, while the three
largest charity ambulance services in the city work
independent of each other and without a central dispatch
center.2 The city also lacks a proper central disaster response
plan and majority of casualties are directed to either the three
major government run tertiary care hospitals or to private
medical institutions with mass trauma management facilities.

Methods
The study evaluated the process of transport and
immediate ER management following these two incidents
using interviews of health care personnel, newspaper
clippings and review of patients presenting at the Aga Khan
University Hospital (AKUH), in Karachi. The Hospital
received 49% of the total injured in the two incidents. All
injured victims of the incidents, whether secondarily
transferred from other hospitals or directly evacuated to
AKUH were included in the study. Data obtained from the
victims included general demographic variables such as age,
gender, mechanism and details of injuries sustained as well as
the outcomes of their management. Informal interviews of the
victims were also conducted to reconstruct a sequence of
events using eyewitness accounts.

Table-1: Nature of injuries presented by
the victims requiring admission.
Nature of Injuries

1st incident
2nd incident
December 28th 2009 February 5th 2010

Orthopaedics
Orthopaedics and Vascular
Abdominal (Solid/Visceral)
Others (including sclera tear and
tympanic membrane perforation)

13
02
03

16
1
1

10

21

with dead bodies and victims with minor injuries. Reports
also suggest that the presence of volunteers and attendants in
the emergency room hindered rescue efforts of medical
personnel.11 The initial casualties arriving there included 12
dead patients, which led to choking of the casualty, prompting
the health minister to announce treatment at government's
expense in private hospitals. This resulted in immediate
transfer of almost all patients to AKUH.
The first evacuated patient arrived at AKUH at 1650
hours. According to official reports, 44 people died while 120
were injured in the incident. The total casualties presented to
AKUH were 54 out of which 28 were admitted while 26
walking wounded were discharged from the ER after
providing necessary treatment. Twenty three victims were
brought to AKUH within an hour of the incidence and
remaining casualties were transferred to the hospital over the
next 12 hours.
Majority of the patients had shrapnel lacerations and
multiple fractures. Two patients had associated vascular
injuries, which included a posterior tibial artery laceration in
one patient and a near total transection of the femoral vein in
the other. Table-1 summaries the various injuries presented

AKUH has a working disaster management plan with
a capacity to handle 50 simultaneous casualties. The plan has
been put into practice on numerous occasions and has been
modified based on our experience with such events.7-9

Results
In the first incident (Ashura: December 28th 2009) a
bomb blast struck the Ashura procession on M.A. Jinnah
Road at around 1615 hours. Initially it was reported as a
suicide attack but later investigations concluded that the
bomb was planted in a box. According to investigators, the
explosives weighed approximately 16 kilograms and also
included nuts, bolts and ball bearings to maximize
casualties.4,10 Shortly after the incident security officials,
scout personnel and ambulance services accompanying the
procession immediately started evacuating the dead and
injured. Most of the victims were taken to Civil Hospital
Karachi, a government operated tertiary health care center.
No system of triage was present at the bomb blast site which
resulted in a chaotic influx of severely injured intermixed
562

Figure: Map of Karachi,25 depicting major trauma centers and bomb blast sites.
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Table-2: Summary of bomb blasts.
Date Of Incident

December 28th 2009

Preparation Time
1615
One km
18 km
35 minutes
Transportation Issues
Resuscitation during transfer
None
Transfer prioritization
None
Nature of Injuries (Details in Table-1)
Walking wounded coming to AKUH
26
Patients with major injuries requiring admission
28
Administrative and Security Issues outside the Hospital
Crowd management strategies
Scouts and volunteers participated
in controlling mob.
Crowd control
Good
ER Management Issues
Crowd management strategies
Hospital security and religious
leaders participated in controlling mob.
Crowd control
Good
Surgical Requirements
Major trauma burden
Orthopaedic
Time of bomb blast
Distance from the nearest public sector hospital
Distance from AKUH
First arrival at AKUH

by the victims who required admission at AKUH. The mean
age of victims who were admitted was 17 years (range 10-40
years) of which only one was female. Two mortalities
occurred at our institute; one was an early mortality due to
tension pneumothorax and hypovolaemic shock, while the
other late mortality was due to septicaemia.
The second incident (Chehlum: February 5th 2010)
occurring exactly forty days later, included twin bomb blasts.
This incident targeted a health care facility where injured
were being treated, thus raising questions about the security
of the medical and paramedical staff involved in rescue
efforts. The terrorists first targeted a bus at Shahrah-e-Faisal
carrying civilians on their way to a religious (Chehlum)
procession at 1500 hours. Fourteen individuals were killed
while 60 were injured in the blast.12 Charity ambulance
services were quick to respond and started evacuating the
dead and injured to the nearest public sector hospital and
AKUH. At 1635 hours the public sector hospital itself
became a victim of terrorism when another blast occurred
yards away from the casualty leading to utter chaos and
second wave of casualties. Most of the injured were relatives
of the first blast victims, with a few paramedical staff and
media personnel also involved in the incident. Overall 13
deaths were reported in the second blast while over 50
individuals were injured.13 The presence of a blast in close
proximity to the emergency department paralyzed the relief
efforts and all victims from the two blasts were shifted to
AKUH irrespective of their injury severity.5
Due to a lack of command and control, a sudden and
overwhelming influx of patients occurred at AKUH,
Vol. 61, No. 6, June 2011

February 5th 2009

February 5th 2009

1500
3 Kilometers
7 Kilometers
60 minutes

1700
NA
10 Kilometers
27 minutes

None
None

None
None

31
39

Some issues
Poor

Some issues
Poor

Some issues
Poor

Some issues
Poor

Orthopaedic

Orthopaedic

necessitating temporary closure of the main hospital gate for
half an hour, in order to force ambulances to shift patients
elsewhere. This diverted further casualties to Liaquat
National Hospital.5
As the hospital staff was busy managing the rapid
influx of victims, the emergency department became
increasingly filled with relatives of the victims and
volunteers. A total of 70 patients presented in the emergency
room of AKUH, some came directly after the first blast while
others were shifted to AKUH after the relief efforts had halted
at the primary managing hospital. Out of those 70 patients, 39
were admitted under various sub specialties of surgery while
31 with minor injuries were managed and discharged. Two
deaths on arrival were also noted in the ER. Two mortalities
occurred at our institute, the first one was an early mortality
secondary to hypovolaemic shock, while the other a late
mortality was due to septicaemia and ensuing multi organ
failure. Summary of the bomb blasts are shown in Table-2.

Discussion
Pakistan has been increasingly targeted by terrorists in
the form of suicide bombings involving bombers exploding
suicide vests or carrying large loads of explosives in vehicles,
as large as a ten wheeler dumper truck.14 The nature and
intensity of these attacks change and these two incidents
consisted of improvised explosive devices (IED) custom
made with a central core of chemical explosives surrounded
by a large collection of nuts and bolts.4 These were high
energy explosives namely C4, which produces a high
intensity sub sonic blast wave. The brunt of this blast wave is
borne mostly by the victims closest to the explosives
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especially in closely packed crowds as in our incidents. These
victims mostly die on the spot, with wide scatter of their
mutilated bodies. Victims further away tend to receive
secondary and tertiary blast injuries of lesser severity.
While most of the earlier attacks targeted security
forces and law enforcement agencies, in 2009 the terrorists
opted to strike softer civilian targets.1 The hospitals to some
extent have developed plans to deal with sudden influx of
casualties. Unfortunately, up till now, no centralized plan has
been established to minimize mortalities associated with such
attacks. Much more importantly the ambulance service are
devoid of a central command and are in a rush and
competition to take all casualties to the hospitals in the
shortest span of time. The following text discusses the issues
as stage of scene command and control, pre-hospital care and
effective ER management.

Scene Command and Control and Pre hospital
Care:
Karachi, like other major cities of the country does not
have a disaster management plan. The provincial government
has recently notified Provincial Disaster Management
Authority (PDMA) with a mandate to form such a plan.
PDMA has conducted a workshop after the second incident to
bring stake holders together.15
The city has a unique situation of completely private
and charity based ambulance service. Therefore a central
command and dispatch does not exist and each major
ambulance service has its own command. Despite availability
of communication between the ambulances of the same
organization, no communication links are present between
various ambulance services, intended casualty receiving
hospital and the security agencies.2 It has also been observed
that the bulk of the victims are dumped at the nearest
designated trauma center without taking into account the
capacity of the hospital.
Although the ambulance services are quick to respond
and reach disaster sites within minutes, the drivers lack any
paramedic training and there are no en-route treatment
facilities other than providing oxygen.2 The absence of scene
commander and triage leads to arrival of dead bodies in the
casualty of the government hospitals first converting the
casualty into a morgue.11 This was highlighted in the first
bombing incident, where the first to reach the hospital were
the dead, rendering the health care facility nearly ineffective.
A system of command and control and scene triage
will result in dead being transferred to a morgue and walking
wounded to be treated away from the main hospitals, thus
decongesting designated trauma centers. Such measures
would greatly improve patient care and outcome of severely
injured victims. A possible reason why there has been
564

difficulty in correcting these problems is that in Karachi,
ambulance services are run by philanthropists and social
workers with no government owned or directed Emergency
Medical Service (EMS) to date. We therefore suggest that in
order to achieve maximally effective disaster response,
philanthropy and charity ambulance services requires better
coordination.
It is imperative that a centralized coordinated disaster
plan should be developed immediately. Pre-hospital
management should be an integral part of this plan, which
addresses problems of communication, security and onsite
triage of the victims. Simultaneous multiple bombings as that
occurred on February 5th 2010, present unique challenges to
the rescue efforts. Any disaster management plan should take
into account such scenarios. A centralized command and
control center should be established with communication
links to paramedic services, security agencies and all major
hospitals. Individuals, preferably trained doctors should be
providing leadership at the disaster site. These experts would
help to establish an onsite triage, identify potentially savable
severely injured victims requiring immediate medical
attention and create a temporary morgue at the site. The role
of triage and timely evacuation cannot be underestimated.16,17
Formal paramedic training should be established to enhance
the pre hospital management of victims.

ER Management:
In a city which lacks a disaster management plan and
on the site triage such as Karachi, the ER is the first point of
triage and is thus inundated with many casualties that do not
belong to it. This problem is compounded even further by the
arrival of relatives and Good Samaritan volunteers in the ER.
Most hospitals at present have not devised effective
information centers to cater for the needs of media and
concerned relatives. It is essential that such centers should be
established at every major trauma facility. These centers
should be located at a certain distance away from the
emergency department, to divert the influx of the concerned
relatives who inadvertently hamper the efficiency of medical
personals.
Since both the incidents took place on public holidays
and involved religious processions; large emotionally
charged crowds were present in and around the ER. This led
to a breakdown of security barriers, not only making it
difficult for the ER to provide care but also making it a soft
target for casualty generation, as witnessed in the second
incident of 5th February 2010. Such incidents paralyze the
relief efforts5 as the rescuers themselves become victims of
terrorism.
Typically the situation is also compounded by
disruption of mobile phone services, paralysis of public
J Pak Med Assoc

transport, traffic jams and worst of all, immediate initiation of
city wide violence and anarchy.10 In all of these events, health
providers within the hospital were not only over whelmed but
were also under a constant risk of violence from the
emotionally charged crowds. It becomes impossible for a
typical hospital security staff to control a mob situation and in
both the incidents hospital security utilized religious or
political leaders to control and pacify crowds.
Such mob formation which is frequent in our part of
the world, not only hinders rescue efforts, but also results in
damage to expensive equipment. The control of emotionally
charged crowds cannot be overemphasized.
The bombing of a hospital has raised many questions
about the security of health care personnel as these facilities
are soft target for the terrorist and make a bad situation
worse.18 We feel that any disaster management plan should
incorporate provision of an effective security at the bomb
blast site and the receiving medical facilities.
The effectiveness of a hospital to deal with a mass
casualty incident (MCI) is greatly dependent on the training
and preparedness of the health care providers.19 This is
especially true for the resident and house officers who due their
continuous presence in the hospital are the first to respond and
thus receive the initial casualties. A recent study analyzing the
relief effort of junior doctors in a mass casualty incident at
public sector hospitals in Karachi found that 52% of the
doctors felt they needed to undergo a comprehensive training
programme. In addition, 35% of the respondents in that study
felt they were not assigned any specific roles in the previous
MCI rescue effort.2 With the ever increasing threat of terrorism
in our country, it is essential that the training of doctors and
paramedical staff should be initiated as early as possible.
Mandatory participation in simulated drills and classroom
courses should be ensured as they play a fundamental role in
preparedness for such scenarios.20 It has been recommended
that simulated drills should be conducted at least once a year;
as such exercises provide practical feedback on the deficiencies
and problems encountered in real life.
Appointment of specialist trauma physicians as triage
officers has been consistently emphasized.21,22 Studies have
suggested that this may well be the most important factor in
reducing preventable mortalities.23 As illustrated in our study,
most of the victims in terrorist bombings had sustained minor
injuries. These victims may arrive at the emergency
department by themselves and subsequently overwhelm the
ER capacity. This chaotic scenario may not be totally
avoidable although few papers have suggested dividing the
ER into three areas designated as a mild injury site, moderate
casualty site and severe casualty site.24 Such an approach is
likely to streamline the management of victims, allowing
greater focus on the care of those requiring urgent
Vol. 61, No. 6, June 2011

intervention, especially under circumstances such as ours
where walking wounded flood the ER.
Currently three major public sector hospitals in
Karachi have been designated as primary trauma centers.
Private teaching hospitals with trauma management facilities
do exist in the city, and these centers should be properly
integrated into the disaster management plan to help decrease
the load of public sector hospitals.7

Conclusion
It is imperative that a comprehensive disaster plan is
made for the city of Karachi, involving all stake holders
including charity ambulance services, security agencies,
public and private sector hospitals. Training courses for
paramedics and doctors should be made mandatory to
achieve professional excellence. A central command and
control system also needs to be established to efficiently
manage any future threats to the city.
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